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Introduction 
 
This paper aims to identify the interactions between the elements of regime complexes 
beginning with an analysis of the interactions between two large regime complexes: 
climate and biodiversity. In the realm of global governance, fragmentation is a recognized 
and recurrent feature (Frank Biermann, Pattberg, van Asselt, & Zelli, 2009), and the 
multiple causalities underlying global governance issues along with their often cross-
sectoral and cross-scale dynamics constitute major driving forces for fragmented 
governance. This fragmentation involves interactions between various networks, 
institutions, values and norms, but the concept of a regime complex (R. O.  Keohane & D. 
G.  Victor, 2010) allows us to look beyond this apparent fragmentation and take into 
account the influence of these networks of norms and actors that intervene within formal 
intergovernmental processes.  Orsini, Morin, & Young defined a regime complex “as a 
network of three or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; 
exhibit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative 
interactions recognized as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed 
effectively” (Orsini, Morin, & Young, 2013). Moreover, the concepts of a regime complex 
and of the architecture of global environmental governance (Franck Biermann, Pattberg, 
van Hasselt, & Zelli, 2009) assume the hierarchies, the forms of dependence, and the 
influence between regimes or accords. The question that arises from this interaction is to 
know if the climate regime complex, with its anteriority and strong recognition by the 
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), plays a  particular role in the 
formation of a biodiversity regime complex along the lines of the diverse modalities. The 
hypothesis we propose is that certain organizations and certain individuals play a 
prominent role in conveying the ideas and models of the climate regime complex to the 
biodiversity regime complex. After a more precise analysis of the concept of the regime 
complex and its relevance to the understanding of global environmental governance, we 
will examine the emergence and installation of these two regime complexes, climate and 
biodiversity. And finally, we end with a discussion on the interaction modalities between 
regime complexes, and the role played by certain actors and organizations. 
 
Part 1 : Global environmental governance and the concept of a regime complex. 
 
For more than a century, the environmental field with its inherent diversity has been a 
source for the creation and development of numerous institutions and international 
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agreements. During this extended period, studies show the specific character of a policy 
arena where the work of international institutions is first seen in the agreements 
involving nongovernmental organizations and then agreements among states, and after 
the 1970s a progression to intergovernmental organizations (Meyer, Frank, Hironaka, 
Schofer, & Nancy Brandon, 1997). The idea of an international regime, defined in broad 
terms as “norms, rules, and procedures agreed to in order to regulate an issue-area” (E. 
B. Haas, 1980), has led to numerous studies on international governance with respect to 
three general questions: the emergence of regimes, their effectiveness, and the 
transformation of their forms of governance (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997).  
 
The question of interdependence between agreements and institutions has occupied 
studies from early on: E. Hass points out that “Nowadays, governments recognize 
complex cause-and-effect linkages between issues they once considered as distinct” and 
reignites the idea of “complex interdependence” to highlight the complex and tangled 
mass of questions that States and international organizations seek to manage at the 
international level (E. B. Haas, 1980).  
 
A large body of literature takes on the task of analyzing the emergence and functionality 
of international environmental regimes through multiple case studies on international 
institutions constructed around an issue area at the center of a field1. The work of 
Breitmeier, Young and Zürn seeks to go further than these case studies by concentrating 
on the construction of a data base of 23 international environmental regimes composed 
of 172 “regime elements” (Breitmeier, Young, & Zürn, 2006). These studies consider a 
regime to be composed of several relatively independent subsets,  grouped around a 
particular agreement during a given period of time, and presenting a path for the 
exploration of the complexity at the interior of the regime. 
 
Indeed, following the paths through the multiplication of agreements, regimes, and 
institutions as well as the interventions of an increasing number of different actors (state 
and non-state actors, transnational actors, . . .) lead certain studies to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the complicated dynamics of interdependence. At this 
point, fragmentation is fully recognized as a recurrent feature of global environmental 
governance (Frank Biermann et al., 2009). The multiple causalities underlying global 
governance issues, often cross-sectoral and cross-scales in nature are major factors 
behind the forces driving this fragmentation of governance involving the interactions 
between various networks, institutions, values, and norms. Bierman and his colleagues 
set out to differentiate three types of fragmentation: synergic, cooperative, and 
conflictive. For them, analyzing the fragmentation is a way to develop a research agenda 
on global governance architectures rooted in the earlier works on interlocking 
                                                          
1 Like (Franck Biermann et al., 2009), “We understand the term “issue area” in a narrow sense compared to the more generic term “policy domain.” Environment and trade constitute two different policy domains, whereas, for instance, climate change and biological diversity are two issue areas, both pertaining to the domain of environment” 
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institutions, and more recent works on the interplay or overlap between international 
institutions or regimes (Franck Biermann et al., 2009).   
 
Following this trend in research on complexity and fragmentation, the concept of a 
regime complex was developed to characterize the situations where questions at the 
international level brought into play several “regime elements”.  Raustiala and Victor 
describe a regime complex: “Rather than a single, discrete regime governing Plant 
Genetic Resources (PGR), the relevant rules are found in at least five clusters of 
international legal agreements – what we call elemental regimes – as well as in national 
rules within key states, especially the United States and the European Union (EU). These 
elemental regimes overlap in scope, subject, and time; events in one affect those in 
others. We term the collective of these elements a regime complex: an array of partially 
overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area” (Kal 
Raustiala & David G. Victor, 2004). Kehoane and Victor fine-tune this idea of a regime 
complex: “At one extreme are fully integrated institutions that impose regulation 
through comprehensive, hierarchical rules. At the other extreme are highly fragmented 
collections of institutions with no identifiable core and weak or nonexistent linkages 
between regime elements. In between is a wide range that includes nested (semi-
hierarchical) regimes with identifiable cores and non-hierarchical but loosely coupled 
systems of institutions. What we are calling “regime complexes” are arrangement of the 
loosely coupled variety located somewhere in the middle of this continuum: there are 
connections between the specific and relatively narrow regimes, but no overall 
architecture that structures the whole set” (R. O. Keohane & David G. Victor, 2010) (p 3-
4).  
 
The authors believe that “often several narrow regimes coexist in the same issue-area 
without clear hierarchy. Under these conditions, which favor, conflicts between individual 
regulatory elements may be especially likely to arise.” In this last context, they point to 
the strategy of forum-shifting where the States sometimes seek to displace the 
regulatory agenda from one organization to another, either abandoning the first or 
sharing the agenda among several organizations. “To solve problems in each forum, 
governments try to link issues in the forum to other issues in ways that will help them 
achieve their objectives. Yet institutional design may favor continued fragmentation, such 
as when it is administratively difficult to create extensive links between distinct 
regulatory elements. The result can be a regime complex.”  By examining the forces of 
fragmentation and integration in the climate regime complex, the authors suggest “to 
think about international regimes and regime complexes in ways that could facilitate 
effective action on the pressing contemporary set of problems surrounding climate 
change.” More recently, Orsini, Morin and Young debate the definition of Raustiala and 
Victor and suggest the following definition: “Regime complex as a network of three or 
more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping 
membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognized 
as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively” (Orsini et al., 
2013).  
 
The question that arises from this discussion is to know if the climate regime complex, by 
virtue of its anteriority and the strong influence of the IPCC, plays a particular role to 
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inspire, among the diverse modalities, the biodiversity regime complex. Our hypothesis is 
that certain organizations and certain individuals play a  prominent role in the transfer of 
ideas and models of the climate regime complex to the biodiversity regime complex. 
 
The concept of a regime complex, and that of an architecture of global environmental 
governance (Franck Biermann et al., 2009) assume hierarchies and forms of dependency 
or influence between regimes and agreements. The concept of a regime complex has 
above all been created to explore the internal complexity of a given regime. 
 
Part 2: Emergence and installation of the climate and biodiversity regime complexes. 
2.1 The climate regime complex: a unified complex 
 
It has become trite to point out that global warming or climate change is a world-wide 
problem, and the climate regime complex is fairly unified as compared to the more recent 
regimes of biodiversity. The governance of climate change follows a course of action 
designed to set up decision making mechanisms that guarantee the quality of knowledge. 
According to Young  (Young, 1998) p2, we can identify three stages of regime 
development: agenda formation, negotiation and operationalization.  
 
Andresen and Agrawala (Andresen & Agrawala, 2002), contend that the agenda 
formation period of the climate regime extends from the late 1950s to the start of 
intergovernmental negotiations in early 1991. This stage can be further sub-divided into 
two phases. The first continues until the Toronto Conference of 1988 which saw the first 
international success of the idea of cutting emissions. This is a period completely 
dominated by non-state actors. The first worldwide conference on the climate takes place 
in 1979 under the aegis of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). The WMO 
initiates a research program (World Climate Program) and lays the foundation for three 
meetings held in 1980, 1983, and 1985 at Villach in Austria. The idea of an 
intergovernmental forum of expertise on the subject of climate change first emerges at 
those meetings in Austria, and the first recommendations for the reduction of carbon 
dioxide emissions were formulated during two subsequent meetings in 1987.  The 
following year, 1988, corresponds to the creation of the IPCC and opens the second 
phase of “formation”.  The United States plays a decisive role in the creation of an 
intergovernmental mechanism. The IPCC mission does not include undertaking actual 
scientific research, but focuses on evaluating studies already achieved and proposing a 
synthesis of the work.  Nevertheless, the IPCC amasses a store of knowledge, highly 
regarded and anticipated, on the state of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Since 1990, 
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the IPCC has produced general and special reports on global warming and it makes up 
one of the three essential elements of the climate regime complex (Dahan Damedico & 
Guillemot, 2006; Encinas de Munagorri, 2009; Paterson, 1993). The latter phase of the first 
stage of formation also witnesses the gradual ascendance of State actors and early 
informal negotiations from 1988 to 1991. 
 
The second, or “negotiation stage” begins in 1991 with the adoption of the Climate 
Convention and continues until the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997.  In 
1985, inspired by the success of the negotiations on the ozone and the signing of the 
Montreal Protocol, Mustapha Tolba, director of the United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP), forcefully expresses the hope of achieving an international convention 
on climate, at the Villach conferences. But it wasn’t until 1992 that the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed at the Rio Conference. 
The UNFCCC along with the subsequent Conferences of the Parties (COP) constitute the 
base of world governance for the climate. In the convention framework adopted in 1992, 
the goal of a reduction of greenhouse gases is established and will lead to commitments 
to actual numbers. 
 
The third stage of “operationalization” is achieved beginning in 1997 with the adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol. The protocol attempts to secure the commitments made in the 
UNFCCC by putting in place the mechanisms known as Flexibility Mechanisms2(Goers, 
Wagner, & Wegmayr, 2010; Schneider, 1998; Tietenberg, 2003). The Kyoto Protocol is in 
some ways the implementation instrument for the decisions of the COP. After Kyoto, and 
following the failure of the conference in Copenhagen that was meant to reorganize 
terms for a second agreement, it is decided at the Doha Conference in 2012 to extend the 
Kyoto Protocol up to 2020. The Doha agreement reaffirms the goal to adopt “a protocol, 
another legal instrument, or some form of legally binding agreement” at the United 
Nations (UN) conference scheduled for 2015 that would go into effect in 2020, and reflect 
the goal of limiting the global elevation of temperature to +2ºC. Rather than being limited 
to the industrialized nations as in the Kyoto Protocol, this agreement includes all 
countries, including the large emerging countries and the United States. 
 
                                                          
2 Rather than set up a system of taxes, the Kyoto Protocol put in place economic incentives in the form of two types of 
mechanisms which are different but unified by the creation of a carbon unit as the means of exchange: carbon 
emissions trading by the States, and two project-based mechanisms, the clean development mechanism (CDM), and 
Joint Implementation (JI). Supported by the US, this scheme was first considered with extreme prudence by the 
Europeans before becoming its principal defenders after the turn of the century. In the end, the United States did not 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol when the Senate legislature determined that it hurt US competitiveness against emerging 
countries that would not have the constraint of limiting their emissions under the Kyoto framework. 
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This historic approach of the climate regime complex shows that the questions 
surrounding global warming were examined at the heart of a single convention, the 
UNFCCC, with which the IPCC and the Kyoto Protocol are closely associated. Many 
participants revolve around these three elements. Keohane and Victor more precisely 
identify the elements that compose a regime complex: the institutions or clusters of 
institutions (R. O. Keohane & David G. Victor, 2010; Keohane & Victor, 2011), and notably 
the international organizations (e.g. UN agencies, Multilateral Development Banks,...), 
the inter-State regulation framework (UN Legal Regime), the country clubs (G20,...), the 
scientific evaluation authorities (IPCC,...). the initiatives (unilateral, bilateral), and the 
specific agreements (Montreal Protocol). 
 
 
 
Michonski and Levi propose a more detailed description of the composition of the climate 
change regime complex (Michonski & Levi, 2010) identifying 7 large categories : 
environmental institutions, informal leader forums, sector-based institutions, energy 
institutions, development institutions (non-banking), multilateral development banks, 
and other institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yamin and Depledge 
also identify 4 large categories of participants in the regime complex (Yamin & Depledge, 
2004) and go even further by showing that the climate regime interacts with other 
multilateral environmental regimes. In addition the international commerce regime 
(WTO) and the human rights regime by virtue of the question of climate refugees are 
implicated in the mix. And it should be noted that the complex climate regime also 
integrates the negotiations related to the questions of biodiversity and to global warming 
through the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) type 
mechanisms. Launched in 2008, the United Nations REDD program or UN-REDD is a 
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mechanism established under the UNFCCC that was created to help developing countries 
carry out REDD+ strategies. 
 
Although the climate regime complex may interact with other regime complexes 
(commerce, biodiversity), it remains nevertheless a regime complex that is unified around 
a single convention, and is by consequence, less fragmented than the biodiversity regime 
complex. 
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2.2 The fragmentation of the biodiversity regime complex. 
 
Few works attempt to understand the biodiversity regime complex as a whole since the 
complex is scattered among several sub-groups, all of which address specific dimensions 
of biodiversity while still being conducted to deal with the same themes. (Le Prestre, 
2004). In addition, the creation of the biodiversity regime complex has not followed a 
linear evolution, leaving little relevance to Young’s theory on the construction of regimes. 
Above all, the regime complex is characterized by its fragmentation and more recently by 
several initiatives intending to advance the global understanding of biodiversity questions 
and thereby improve the unity of the regime. 
 
 
Historically, well known scientists begin to draw attention in the late 1970s to a mounting concern 
over the extinction of species. But it is the middle of the 1980s before the “biodiversity crisis” 
(Takacs, 1996) becomes a focus for the media, leaders, and the general public through 
the emergence and diffusion of the neologism, “biodiversity” (as a contraction of biology 
and diversity). During the same period, in 1980, the International Union for Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN), supported by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF) presents a strategy for global conservation of biodiversity that aims 
to reconcile the objectives of conservation and development, which had been 
traditionally judged incompatible. 
 
The plan from the IUCN is an early landmark in favor of a multilateral regime for biological 
diversity, and serves as a base for the preliminary texts that occupied the negotiations of 
1990. Little by little, the questions of biodiversity begin to insert themselves at the 
international level, and reach another milestone as they appear firmly in the framework 
of the Rio Summit (1992) and the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) of the same 
year. However, where the question of climate change is managed at the international 
level through the single structure of the UNFCCC, the questions related to biodiversity are 
treated in an ensemble of conventions and international agreements, each with their own 
dynamic and modes of function. In fact, several international conventions treat 
biodiversity in a sectoral fashion such as the conservation of wet lands in the Ramsar 
Convention (1971), the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES)(1973), the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) adopted in 1979 and in place 
since 1983,  and the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (UPOV) first established in 1961 and then amended in 1978 and 1991.  These 
conventions can also be uniquely regional constructs, such as the Bern Convention on the 
conservation of nature in Europe. 
 
Surrounding the complex of conventions are numerous actors who may concentrate on 
one convention or several at the same time. Even at the center of the biodiversity regime 
complex, we can identify sub-groups of specific actors and even specific protocols, all 
structured around a single convention. For example, the regime of plant genetic 
resources (PGR) is analyzed by Raustaiala and Victor  (K Raustiala & D. G. Victor, 2004) 
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who suggest that the regime complex consists of 5 clusters of international accords that 
they call the elementary regimes: the UPOV, the International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources (IUPGR) of 1983 and the 2002 international Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources (TPGR) negotiated under the auspices of the UN and the FAO,  the 
Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research (CGIAR), the WTO’s  Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the CBD. 
 
Although the CBD could be considered as offering an encompassing framework for 
biodiversity questions, it is primarily concerned with regulatory questions of access to 
genetic resources, especially through the 2000 complementary agreement on biosecurity 
(the Carthage Protocol, and later the Nagoya Protocol of 2010). Thus the questions of 
genetic resource management take precedence over the questions of natural habitat and 
species conservation (Boisvert & Vivien, 2010). The IPCC inspired the idea of an 
international evaluation on biodiversity, and in this context, the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MA) emerged. The MA introduces and popularizes the concept of 
ecosystem service and thus permits, in a larger sense, the proposal of a more global 
approach to biodiversity (Pesche, Méral, Hrabanski, & Bonnin, 2013). The MA is an 
important step in the process of the unification of multilateral agreements dealing with  
biodiversity that finally succeeds in 2010 with the creation of the Intergovernmental 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES).  However, the biodiversity 
regime complex rests fragmented between numerous sub-groups (endangered species, 
genetic resources…) and interactions with other complexes such as commerce, climate, 
and human rights. Furthermore, as previously noted, the broad field of forest 
conservation spans both the climate regime complex and the biodiversity complex, and it 
does so to the extent that certain authors talk about a non-regime to qualify the 
multiplicity of efforts at forestry regulation and management (Dimitrov, Sprinz, DiGiusto, 
& Kelle, 2007). 
 
Partial Conclusion 
 
It is clear that the climate regime complex precedes the biodiversity regime complex.  The 
IPCC is established in 1988 and will inspire subsequent creations and eventually the MA 
between 2001 and 2005. But  it isn’t until the IPBES arrives in 2010 that we see the 
creation of a permanent intergovernmental expertise based on the model of the IPCC. 
Similarly, even though the UNFCCC and the CBD are both signed in 1997, the regime 
complex simply acquires an implementation instrument from the decisions of the COP of 
the UNFCCC.  In the biodiversity regime complex, two protocols come later with the 
signature in 2000 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, then the 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, but these protocols only covered a specific dimension of biodiversity 
questions. 
 
The climate regime complex is also more unified than the biodiversity regime complex. 
Although the climate regime complex interacts with several other regime complexes, it is 
nevertheless structured around a single convention that combines multiple actors. Some 
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of these actors are also active in the biodiversity regime complex and in the numerous 
sub-groups that it encompasses. 
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2.3 Regime Comlexes, interfaces and circulation 
 
The theories on international regimes have generally granted a prominent place to State and 
intergovernmental actors, while at the same time recognizing the growing role of non-State 
actors in global environmental governance (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Betsill & Corell, 2001; 
Boström & Hallström, 2010; Conca, 1995). The increasing diversity of institutions is 
recognized as one of the reasons behind the growing complexity of regimes and one of 
the primary challenges in the efforts to construct stable and effective international 
agreements. According to Alter and Meunier, the complexity of international 
environmental regimes is affecting the decisions and the behavior of actors : the experts 
(NGOs, legal experts…) play a growing role in accompanying the States in navigating this 
confusing institutional scene (Alter & Meunier, 2009). 
 
Institutional complexity has recently been the subject of research seeking to better 
understand the mechanisms of actor influence in the multiple forums and environmental 
regimes. The practice of forum shopping, shifting, or linking enables the analysis of the 
work of State and non-State actors in a way that isolates part of the institutional 
fragmentation: with their ability to participate in several forums in parallel, these actors 
who are already influential in general, acquire added practical experience, access 
strategic information, and can often reinforce their position (Alter & Meunier, 2009; 
Orsini, 2013).         
 
In general, the actors studied in the analyses are collective actors (Etats, international 
organizations, companies, NGOs,…) but several studies also underling the potential 
importance played by interconnected individuals. The concept of a transnational 
epistemic community evokes an image of a network of individuals across institutions that 
play an important role in bringing together ideas in the function of international regimes : 
“members of transnational epistemic communities can influence state interests either by 
directly identifying them for decision makers or by illuminating the salient dimensions of 
an issue from which the decision makers may then deduce their interests. The decision 
makers in one state may, in turn, influence the interests and behavior of other states, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of convergent state behavior and international policy 
coordination, informed by the causal beliefs and policy preferences of the epistemic 
community. Similarly, epistemic communities may contribute to the creation and 
maintenance of social institutions that guide international behavior” (P. M. Haas, 1992)” 
 
In their work on the construction of a database covering international environmental 
regimes, Breitmeier, Young and Zürn, include not only the States, and certain NGOs and 
companies, but also individuals that play a notable role in the emergence of a regime. As 
the authors state, several individuals play, alone, a specific role in more than one regime 
(Breitmeier et al., 2006). The research of Moravcsik explores the roles played by 
“supranational policy entrepreneurs” in the construction of international accords As 
Moravcsik points out, “supranational actors wield influence due to a superior ability to 
overcome domestic and transnational coordination problems, which reflects greater 
administrative coherence, insulation from social interests and centrality in transnational 
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networks.” These transnational entrepreneurs play the role of advocate, to persuade or 
influence States in the form of three principal functions: “The first function is policy 
initiation, sometimes termed “in-formal agenda-setting”, in which the entrepreneur 
launches a discussion by highlighting problems, advancing workable proposals, 
underscoring potential material benefits, or linking the outcome to symbolic values. The 
second function is mediation, in which the entrepreneur intervenes in ongoing interstate 
negotiations to propose new options or compromises. The third function is mobilization 
of domestic social support for an agreement” (Moravcsik, 1999). These analyses agree 
with research conducted on the study of domestic public policy that grants an important 
role to the ideas in policy change and considers the face of the “broker” as an important 
explanatory element of policy change. (Kingdon, 1995; Sabatier, 2007).  
 
In the list of authors cited below, we give particular importance to the individual actors 
strongly involved in the emergence and function of the regime complexes as a means of 
identifying those who play a role of “broker” or conduit at the interface between 
complexes. 
Part 3 Connected regime complexes : micro and macro analyses of the interaction 
modalities between climate and biodiversity regime complexes. 
 
3.1 Organizations implicated in the 2 regimes 
 
Several institutions with central roles in global governance (UNEP, United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), FAO, World Bank) clearly contribute to the substance and 
structure of forums, accords and regimes. Certain non-State actors (NGO, think tank, 
business associations, research centers) are also found in multiple forums and contribute 
to the circulation of ideas and models between regime complexes. 
 
Michonski and Levi show that it is possible to identify 7 large categories of entities that 
are mobilized in the climate regime complex: 1. institutions focused on the environment 
such as the UNEP, 2. informal leader forums, 3. sectoral institutions, 4. institutions 
focused on energy, 5. (non-banking) development institutions, 6. multilateral and 
development banks, 7. other institutions such as the WTO. 
 
Taking inspiration from this classification, we were able to identify the types of entities 
that are present in both biodiversity and climate regime complexes. In both regimes, we 
were able to actually identify environmental institutions, such as the UNEP, development 
institutions, multilateral development banks, and institutions like the WTO. However the 
two complexes do not harbor the same informal leader forums, or sectoral institutions, 
nor do we find the same energy institutions. There are however other actors and 
organizations participating in both complexes. The work of Yamin and Pledge also 
identifies countries or groups of countries, and NGOs (noting the large families: 
environmental NGOs, business and industry associations, local authorities, indigenous 
associations, NGOs tied to research). 
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Combining this work produces a typology of the organizations present in both the 
climate regime complex and the biodiversity complex based on the following categories: 
1. Institutions specialized on the environment such as the UNEP 
2. Non-banking development institutions (FAO, WFP) 
3. Multilateral development banks 
4. Other institutions such as the WTO 
5. Countries and groups of countries 
6. NGOs (environmental NGOs, NGOs tied to research, business NGOs, indigenous 
associations, and NGOs tied to local authorities 
7. Research organisms (universities, research centers) 
 
Found at the interface between the two regimes, these 7 types of organizations 
participate in the circulation of the norms and public policy models between regimes. In 
order to clarify the analysis on the circulation modalities, we chose to develop a more 
micro sociological analysis. Even if these organizations can be found in several regime 
complexes, the same department or service is not always implicated in one or the other 
of the regimes. The link is more often found in individuals situated in key posts in certain 
institutions who have professional paths which cross or hinge between several political or 
scientific processes. 
 
In order to test the relevance of a more micro sociological analysis, we examined a key 
event in the process of the consolidation of the biodiversity regime complex, the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2001-2005). This exercise will first allow us to analyze 
to what degree the IPCC influence the MA in terms of an organizational model. Following, 
we will analyze the participation of the experts implicated in the MA and in the climate 
complex in order to identify the instances where there is an interface of exchange and to 
better understand the modalities of interaction between the to complexes. 
3.2. The conditions of a global evaluation of ecosystems: the model of the IPCC? 
 
The Group of Intergovernmental Experts on Climate evolution (GIEC/IPCC) has witnessed 
complex and ambivalent relations between science and policy decisions. Even if they raise 
controversy between Northern-Southern relations, the first reports (1990 and 1995) 
appear to many as models of scientific evaluation intended to educate policy decision 
makers.  
 
A short time after the creation of the CBD (1992-1994) a global evaluation of the state of 
the biodiversity is initiated with the support of the UNEP and the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF)(1993-1995). The Global Biodiversity Assessment (GBA) seekes to create an 
independent scientific exercise to establish the state of the art on questions tied to the 
complex subject of biodiversity (Heywood, 1995). The report of the GBA does not make a 
recommendation to decision makers and carries the principle message that there is still a 
very limited base of knowledge on the processes related to the questions of biological 
diversity.  As noted by Robert Watson, the GBA exercise was an excellent scientific work, 
but it had practically no impact on policy formulation because it was conducted like a 
non-governmental exercise, without approval of the public powers (Frank Biermann, 
2001). The report of the GBA does not make a recommendation to decision makers and 
carries the principle message that there is still a very limited base of knowledge on the 
14 
 
processes related to the questions of biological diversity.  As noted by Robert Watson, 
the GBA exercise was an excellent scientific work, but it had practically no impact on 
policy formulation because it was conducted like a non-governmental exercise, without 
approval of government entities (Watson, 2005). In addition, it was partially rejected by 
the intergovernmental authorities: certain countries, like Brazil, rejected the conclusions, 
considering that they never asked for that type of evaluation 3.  
 
In the charged context that follows the Rio Summit, with the implementation of several 
intergovernmental Conventions, some parties feel that the fragmentation of the 
criticisms and analyses weaken the possibility to carry out significant change in 
environmental practices. One study organized jointly by the United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the 
World Bank provides an excellent illustration of this growing awareness: “The importance 
of global environmental issues - such as climate change, loss of biological diversity, 
stratospheric ozone depletion, deforestation, and water degradation - to poverty alleviation 
and development is now becoming more fully recognized. However, these global 
environmental issues are, to a large extent, normally thought of as isolated issues by both 
the scientific and policy communities. As a result, they often fail to adequately recognize 
that there are strong scientific and policy interlinkages among the global environmental 
issues, between global environmental issues and local and regional environmental issues, 
and between environmental issues and basic human needs-adequate food, clean water, 
energy services, and a healthy environment. If these global environmental issues are to be 
addressed within a more holistic and synergistic policy framework it is essential to gain an 
improved understanding of the scientific and policy interlinkages among them and how they 
influence our ability to meet basic human needs”4. This report constitutes an important 
milestone in process of setting up the MA 5.  
 
Shortly after, at the beginning of 1998, a small group of associates including Harold A. 
Mooney of the International Council for Science (ICSU), Walter V. Reid of the World 
Resources Institute (WRI), and Robert Watson use lessons from the GBA experience to 
set up a device that starts from the beginning by associating the scientific community and 
the potential users of a scientific evaluation (governments, private sector, NGO,…). A 
process completely non-governmental, the idea of the MA develops progressively to 
three international conventions (CBD, CITES, and CMS) and puts in place a system of 
revision by associating pairs of experts and government representatives. The general 
organizational structure of the MA was based in part on that of the IPCC that is often 
brandished as a model in terms of “independent” scientific evaluation.  The work of the 
MA is often organized in three work groups, “condition and trends”, “scenario”, and 
“political responses”. The  MA added a fourth workgroup on sub-global evaluations. The 
credibility of the scientific evaluation process is also related to its capacity to identify and 
qualify the zones of uncertain knowledge often fragmenting for ecosystems. Again taking 
inspiration directly from the IPCC, this aspect was integrated into the work method of the 
MA and thus reinforces the credibility of the information and knowledge produced6. The 
                                                          
3 Entretien avec Harold A. Mooney, mars 2011.  
4 (Watson, Dixon, Hamburg, Janetos, & Moss, 1998) 
5 (Meral, 2010), pages 17 et 18.  
6 (Reid et al., 2002) 
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MA adopted a method that incorporates the information pulled directly from the 
experiences of the IPCC: “The basic methodological approach of the MA is the same as 
that of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Like the IPCC, the MA is a 
critical assessment of the “state of knowledge” pertaining to issues of relevance to the 
Assessments’ audience (…)”. This fairly direct transfer of experience is made possible by 
the fact that the MA animation team is directly influenced by the research conducted 
during this period at the John F. Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University to 
pull information and scientific evaluation in various fields but particularly in the field of 
climate (Cash & Clark, 2001; The Social Learning Group, 2001a, 2001b). 
 
Beyond the direct influence of the IPCC on the MA’s organizational model, it appears the 
experts involved in the MA are largely from the climate regime complex,  which again 
points towards the important contribution of the climate regime complex to the 
unification of the biodiversity regime complex. 
 
3.3 The climate experts involved in the MA 
Experts involved in the most influential organs of the MA 
 
Not all of the 1360 experts assembled in the MA were involved at the same level.  In order 
to analyze their involvement we constructed a database beginning with experts 
implicated exclusively in the assessment panel (17 individuals), the scientific arm of the 
MA in the exploratory committee (22 individuals), and the political organ, the Board (33 
individuals). Three individuals were in all three groups, so we had a sampling of 80 
individuals. With the help of an analysis of the resumes of the experts, several variables 
were coded : the institutional membership of the experts, their involvement in other 
global evaluations, their type of involvement in the MA, their educational or training 
origins, and mentions of other global negotiations. 
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The variable that concerns the involvement of the experts in other regime complexes 
permitted the identification of 12 individuals (out of the 80) that had concurrent 
responsibilities in the highest scientific authorities, and or in the policies of the MA and 
also important responsibilities in the climate regime complex and/or the UNFCCC. The 
number can seem somewhat limited, however their involvement in multiple organisms 
seems to reinforce the idea that these actors were in an interface position that would 
permit them to circulate models, norms, and ideas from one complex to the other. 
 
 
Leemans Rik NTH Environmental 
system analysis 
group 
IPCC technical paper V climate 
and biodiversity 
IPCC working group II climate 
change 2001 Impacts 
adaptation and vulnerability 
AP7 
Gitay Habi
ba 
 Australia  IPCC technical paper V climate 
and biodiversity 
ES
C 
Pasztor Jano
s 
HUN UNFCCC UNFCCC ES
C 
Sarukhan José MEX Université 
autonome du 
IPCC working group II climate 
change 2001 Impacts 
AP 
                                                          
7 AP: Assessment panel; ESC: exploratory scientific committee; B: board 
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mexique adaptation and vulnerability 
Watson Robe
rt 
UK WB IPCC co chair AP, 
ES
C, 
B 
Thorgeirsson Halld
or 
ISL UNFCCC IPCC technical paper V climate 
and biodiversity 
B 
scholes Robe
rt  
SA Natural 
Resources and 
Environment - 
CSIR 
 
IPCC technical paper V climate 
and biodiversity 
AP 
Finlayson Max AUS Ramsar 
Convention on 
Wetlands (SG) 
IPCC technical paper V climate 
and biodiversity 
B 
Dasgupta Parth
a 
IND UK Cambridge WGIII AR5 AP 
, B 
Samper  cristi
an 
US Smithsonian 
Museum 
 
UNFCCC 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
cop5/inf03.pdf 
AP 
ES
C 
Pingali Prab
hu 
IND CYMMIT  IPCC Expert Meeting on The 
Science to Address UNFCCC 
Article 2 including Key 
Vulnerabilities 
AP, 
ES
C 
Shidong Zhao CHIN Acedemy of 
sciences 
ICPP AR4 WG II AP 
 
Among the 12 persons, several occupy positions in at leas two of the central organs to the MA, 
confirming their central placement in the process. Certain individuals had also held positions in 
other sections of the MA (synthesis drafting team, nominating committee…). 
 
Notably, Watson, had multiple positions at the MA (on the board, the assessment panel, and the 
exploratory committee), as well as having been co-chair of the IPCC for several years. More 
precisely, Robert T. Watson is a British chemist, specialized in the question of the ozone. He is 
first, a product of the world of climate change (NASA, research program on Earth...). Then 
beginning in 1991, he presides over the scientific and technical counsel of the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), which seems to push him to also commit to the question of biodiversity, notably as 
president of the Global Biodiversity Assessment (1993-1995). Director of the environmental 
department of the World Bank from 1996 to 2001, then chief scientist and counselor for 
sustainable development at the World Bank, he is from 1997 to 2001 concurrently chairman of the 
IPCC and co-heads 2 workgroups.  Under the leadership of Watson, the IPCC technical paper V on 
climate and biodiversity was produced, and involved several individuals highly placed at the MA in 
the drafting of the report. At the same time, he joins the board of the MA that he co-chairs from 
1998 to 2005. He  is also connected to other regime complexes, especially the agriculture regime 
complex in as much as president of the Board of IAASTD (International Assessment of Agricultural 
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Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) from 2005 to 2007. Today 
Watson is co-chair of the IPBES. This multipositionality places him in a central position where he 
has precise experience and where he can be a carrier of ideas, norms, models of public policy, and 
organizational models from one regime to another. 
 
Experts involved in the drafting of a synthesis report 
 
The outputs of the MA included a general overview and five synthesis reports, each 
targeting a specific audience : biodiversity, desertification, wetlands, the private sector, 
and the health sector. Of the 5 synthesis reports, the one dealing with question 
surrounding business and biodiversity, «Opportunities and Challenges of Business and 
Industry », is particularly interesting. Of the 16 members of the drafting team, 8 had been 
directly involved in the IPCC and/or directly in the negotiations of the UNFCCC and of the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Percy Steve  US BP 
Kyoto 
protocol 
Ebi Kristie US 
Exponent 
Health Group 
IPCC 
Kumar Pushpam  India 
Institute of 
Economic 
Growth 
IPCC 
Yohe Gary US 
Wesleyan 
University 
IPCC 
Lubchenco Jane  US 
Oregon State 
University 
UNFCCC  
Lash jonathan US WRI UNFCCC  
Prickett Glen US CI 
COP 15 
UNFCCC 
Erhmann john US 
Meridian 
Institute 
UNFCCC 
(organisation) 
 
 
Among the 8 individuals, a majority were Americans from diverse organizations : 
universities, research centers, conservation NGO, think tanks, private sector. The 
Meridian Institute was one organization specialized in the organization of global events,  
and the individual had participated in the organization of the UNFCCC. Otherwise, the 
two co-chairs of the synthesis are from the climate regime complex. The two co-chairs of 
this synthesis  report, were the ex-CEO of BP and Jane Lubchenko. The latter was on the 
WRI Board and made herself known through her publications on climate change and her 
appearances in the United States Congress. She is known to promote the links between 
science and business to develop a green economy. 
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The team drafting the synthesis titled « Opportunities and Challenges of Business and 
Industry », has significantly more individuals involved in both the climate regime complex 
and the biodiversity regime complex than the other synthesis teams. 
 
To better understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to look back at the international 
negotiations on climate change during the 1990s. During this period, a business NGO 
coalition emerges that promotes the emblematic market-based mechanism, emissions-
trading (OECD, 1997, 2003, 2007; Pirard, 2012). Meckling uses the advocacy coalition 
approach to describe business involvement in climate issues in the 1990s (Meckling, 2011). 
The author shows how, prior to 1990, the dividing line between the coalitions had been 
between “anti-regulation coalitions” and “coalitions in favor of command and control 
type measures” (ibid, p43). Meckling shows how a third coalition appeared at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the “pro-trading coalition” in favor of carbon trading. This last 
coalition included NGOs and business, and was a more powerful lobby group in the Kyoto 
climate negotiations than in the EU. The members of the coalition gradually relied on 
scientific experts and on allies from national administrations (US) and supranational 
administrations (EU) to develop a market-based regulation of greenhouse gas 
mitigations. This coalition was based on a shared preference for a type of market-based 
GHG governance as the lesser evil compared to a regulatory approach, and on a will to 
develop carbon market instruments, such as greenhouse gas emission quotas, by 
influencing decision-makers. The leaders of this coalition included BP and DuPont. Some 
authors of the drafting team for the synthesis “Opportunities and Challenges of Business 
and Industry” came from the GHG pro-trading coalition, notably the former CEO of BP 
Americas. In our interview with him, he stated, “When I was with BP we were, you may 
recall, or maybe you don’t recall, we were very active on the issue of climate change. And 
we were instrumental at developing internal trading regimes to help us reduce our own 
emissions. I got involved with MBI approaches to solving environmental problems back in 
the 90s with BP” 8. Meckling shows that although business could not prevent the control 
of emissions, it could influence the type of regulation, in favor of market-based 
regulation. Business therefore had a considerable influence over the style of regulation, 
and recruitment of the members of this coalition to the MA was bound to facilitate the 
transfer of public policy solutions from the climate regime to the biodiversity regime.  
  
Market based instruments (MBIs) were adopted in the framework of the negotiations on 
the Kyoto Protocol, and the MA represents an essential stage in the legitimization of the 
economic value (in terms of legal tender) of biodiversity through the use of the concept 
of ecosystem service and the use of MBIs in biodiversity. This analysis reinforces the idea 
that actors, by virtue of their position at the interface between two regime complexes, 
are able to contribute to the circulation of standards and ideas for the development of 
public policy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                          
8 Interview with the former CEO of BP Americas, April 2011. 
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This study sought to know if the climate regime complex, by virtue of its anteriority and 
through the strong recognition of the role of the IPCC, plays a notable role in inspiring the 
diverse modalities of the biodiversity regime complex. The research seems to confirm the 
hypothesis that certain organizations and certain individuals play a predominant role in 
conveying the ideas and models of the climate regime complex towards the biodiversity 
regime complex. This circulation occurs primarily by the transfer of organizational models 
and collective work methods for the function of science-policy interfaces like the IPCC 
and now, the IPBES. The logistics of learning dictate that individuals, having acquired 
particular knowledge or skill in these processes, are the principal candidates for 
participating and managing similar processes. 
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